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Insecurity of Property Rights and Matching in the Tenancy Market 
 
“Because the rights (to most of the poor’s resources) are not adequately documented, these 
assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside narrow local circles where 




Many macro-economic studies have emphasized the role of law enforcement, security of 
contracts and property rights for economic growth and development (Knack and Keefer, 1995; 
Barro, 1996; Heckelman, 2000). The empirical results of these studies however have been 
questioned due to a number of methodological problems found in cross-country growth studies 
in general (see Temple, 1999). In this paper, we will address the importance of insecurity of 
property rights using a micro-level dataset. More specifically, we will analyze how property 
rights affect the functioning of land rental markets in two regions in the Dominican Republic 
(DR).  We show how insecure property rights lead to segmented markets and hence shed light on 
a specific mechanism in which lack of property rights might impede efficiency and equity gains, 
and hence influence growth and development.  
In the DR, land reallocations through the rental market are limited (14%), as in most of 
Latin America. This stands in sharp contrast with agricultural land rental markets  in many other 
parts of the world (e.g. 73% of the land is rented in Belgium, 44% in the United States). 
Different hypotheses can be raised for this lack of land rental market activity, but a factor that is 
likely to be important, in the Dominican Republic, as well as in most other countries in Latin 
America, is the landlord’s fear of loss of the land. Such fear results from insecure property rights, 
due to weak law enforcement, and in many cases, lack of formal title. 
In the Dominican Republic, land ownership and distribution has been severely affected 
over time by the different property right systems of the different foreign powers (Spanish, French 
and American), that got implemented without abolishing the previous system, and by the 
redistributive land reform, initiated in the 60s after the fall of the dictatorial regime of Trujillo. 
Those policies have resulted in a considerable heterogeneity of property rights and in the strength 
of these rights. Furthermore, until today, legislation is in place that allows for expropriation of 
ill-used land, creating incentives for invasions and squatting of land by tenants (Gill, 2000).  
In order to better understand the functioning and the constraints on the land rental market, 
we need to understand what determines access to land through the land rental market. Existing 
empirical work that analyzes the functioning of the land rental market attempts to explain the net 
demand for land as a function of the asset endowments and household characteristics. For 
instance, Deininger and Chamorro (2000) estimate the probability of renting in and show that 
land tenancy markets in Nicaragua enhance equity and efficiency by transferring land to more 
efficient producers with lower land-labor ratios and higher profit levels. This is consistent with 
results of DeSilva (2000) who finds that more skilled households are more likely to rent in. Also 
Baland et al. (2000) model the decision to rent in as a function of the characteristics of the tenant 
and show that land tenancy markets, together with land sale markets, correct for initial inequality 
in land endowments in Uganda.  
In these empirical specifications, one only considers either the characteristics of the 
tenant or the characteristics of the landlord. However, in a situation with considerable excess   2
demand for land, access to land will be determined by the characteristics of the potential tenants 
that are desired by the specific landlords in the market.
1 If all the landlords have the same 
preferences over the type of tenant, the probability of renting in can indeed be modeled as a 
function of the characteristics of the tenant. Yet, with heterogeneous landlords and 
heterogeneous tenants, different landlords might prefer different tenants. In this paper, we will 
argue that these preferences will be significantly influenced by the security of property rights 
over land. In particular,  landlords who are afraid to lose their land, will only trust renting out 
land within narrowly defined social circles. Belonging to the circle of confidence of particular 
landlords will be a key determinant for access to land in environments with a lot of property 
rights insecurity.  
Hence, access to land for a particular tenant will not only depend on his own 
characteristics, but also on the characteristics of all available landlords and all other potential 
tenants, and on the institutional context that might influence the landlords’ preferences. 
Analyzing the matching process on the tenancy market, should therefore help to disentangle the 
micro-foundations of access to land through the land rental market. 
The structure of this paper is as follows: in the next section, we will first discuss the data 
that were collected for the analysis. In section 3, we analyze the determinants of renting in 
considering the tenant characteristics in line with the existing literature. We then turn to the 
analysis of the matching between landlords and tenants in section 4. In the last section we 
conclude and discuss the policy implications of our findings. 
 
2. The Data 
2.1. Survey Methodology 
To analyze access to land through the tenancy market, we use the data we collected 
specifically for this purpose, in two regions of the Dominican Republic (DR).  An “indirect” 
survey approach was used to obtain data on communities and on each household and each plot 
within these communities. The idea behind the indirect approach is that a lot of private 
information is public at the level of the community. Hence, selected informants from the 
community can be used to answer questions about individual community members on matters 
that are locally public.  
The most important advantage of this approach is that it allows to define the universe (in 
our case the complete rental market with all actual and potential tenants and landlords), because 
data are collected on every household in a geographically closed area, and selectivity bias due to 
non-response or difficulties of reaching certain households (often the most marginal groups) is 
eliminated. Furthermore the indirect approach is an efficient method of collecting data, as 
information about a large amount of households can be gathered in a short time period, and with 
relatively little effort compared to direct interviews with each household concerned.  The 
accuracy of the indirect approach still needs to be established, which is the aim of ongoing 
research. However, work by Takasaki, Barham, and Coomes (2000) shows that reliable 
information on households’ asset endowments can be obtained using an indirect survey 
approach.  
  In a first step, basic information about all households and all plots in a community was 
obtained in order to (1) define the complete land rental market, (2) match landlords with their 
respective tenants and hence obtain information about the partners on both sides of the 
                                                 
1 The data show that 49% of the household would be willing to rent in more land at the market rate. This indicates 
that there is indeed an excess demand for land in the market in the regions studied.   3
transaction, and (3) obtain a sampling frame for more detailed household and plot level 
questions. In a second step, a stratified sample of households was drawn in order to oversample 
the landlords and tenants in the population. This was necessary to guarantee sufficient 
observations on the variables of interest, as rental in some communities is a rare event. All 
landlords and tenants were selected, complemented by a random sample of all other households 
in the community. In addition to household-level information, data on all the plots these 
households owned (either owner-cultivated or rented out) and rented in was obtained. Data on 
community characteristics were also collected. 
Data were collected in the regions of Constanza (1092 households) and San Francisco de 
Macoris (1431 households). Constanza is located in a fertile valley in the mountainous area in 
Central DR (La Vega province). It is characterized by a very intensive irrigated horticultural 
production, which depends to a large extent on hired labor. San Francisco de Macoris is located 
in the flatlands of the Cibao region (Duarte province) and agricultural production is mainly rice, 
complemented by plantains and pastures.
2 In both regions, agricultural income is a very 
important component of households’ budgets.  
 
2.2. Descriptive statistics 
  Table 1 shows that the land rental market is quite developed in Constanza and much more 
reduced in San Francisco de Macoris (Table 2). In Constanza, where 77% of the land has a 
formal title, the land rental market involves about half of the households as landlords (25%) or 
tenants (22%) and 52% of the land. In contrast, in San Francisco de Macoris, where only 26% of 
the land has a formal title, only 21% of the households and 39% of the land is part of the land 
rental market. In addition, a larger share of the households is land constrained (i.e., reported as 
wanting to rent in more land) in the second region (60%) as compared to the first (46%).  Hence, 
contrasting these two regions suggests the importance of security of property rights in supporting 
an active land rental market. 
The weakness of property rights in the rice-growing region is not only reflected in the 
low share of titled land, but also in the much greater occurrence of land conflicts (Table 2). The 
frequency of land conflicts originates in a long and complex history of land reform in this region 
and might explain why, in the majority of the communities in the San Francisco region, the 
primary reason for difficult access to land in rental was identified as fear of the landlords to lose 
their land (64% of communities). In contrast, in the Constanza region, where the land reform had 
only a very marginal impact, this seemed not to be the major concern (0% of communities). The 
occurrence of more rental contracts that are in writing in the region of San Francisco might be a 
response to this uncertain environment, although the share of written contracts is still low at only 
21%.  
 
3. Empirical analysis of the determinants of renting 
We first estimate a logit model to analyze the determinants of renting in. A weighted 
regression was used to account for the sample frame. The regression results in the first column of 
table 2 show that the household’s asset endowment is an important determinant of renting in. The 
                                                 
2 In both regions, land is mainly used for annual or seasonal crops, not for perennial crops. Only a limited amount of 
plots are used as pasture. Hence, the use of the land does not seem to be a limiting factor for renting.   4
results confirm that ownership of machinery significantly increases access to land in rental.
 3  A 
positive but diminishing effect of education indicates that a minimum level of education is 
desirable to obtain land in rental, but logically people with a high education rent in less as the 
opportunity cost of their labor in other occupations is higher. Furthermore, households that are 
active in one of the community organizations are more likely to rent in. On the other hand, the 
rental market is effective in redistributing land for cultivation to the landless and land-poor as 
households without land are more likely to rent in and owning more land decreases the 
likelihood of renting in.  
However, access to land through the land rental market is constrained in communities 
with weak property rights or with lack of enforcement of these rights. The regression results 
suggest that access to land is facilitated in communities with a lot of land with strong property 
rights. The presence of conflicts on the other hand, has a very significant negative effect on land 
rental.
4 Furthermore, we see that in communities that were categorized as being well “united” 
land rental is less likely. Although counterintuitive at first sight, this suggests that in 
communities with a lot of social capital, this social capital plays in favor of the poor, hence 
inducing fear among those with a lot of land to rent out to the poor. This is confirmed by the 
interaction term showing that, for those who own more land themselves, access to land actually 
increases in the more united communities. This interpretation of the pro-poor bias of well-united 
communities was confirmed in extensive field interviewing.
5 
Landowners are more likely to trust people that belong to the same kin or the same socio-
economic group. To investigate whether belonging to the circle of confidence is more important 
in the absence of secure property rights, we introduce interaction terms between the circle of 
confidence variables and security of property rights. The results show that in the absence of 
secure property rights, having a lot of family members (and hence potentially a lot of landlords 
who trust the household) in the community becomes an important determinant of access to land. 
Also having a lot of parcels owned by people of the same ownership category increases the 
likelihood of renting when property rights are insecure. This result suggests that the role of circle 
of confidence in supporting land rental contracts declines when property rights become stronger. 
In an alternative specification in column 2, the positive sign of the number of parcels owned by 
members with the same livings standard also confirm that belonging to the circle of confidence 
of potential landlords is a crucial determinant of access to land.  
Access to land is also more difficult in larger communities (as measured by the total 
number of parcels owned by community members) which might be due to the fact that both 
observability and social enforcement of contracts is more difficult in these communities. The 
regression further shows that the higher the number of landowners without machinery in a 
community, the higher the probability of renting in, which further underlines the fact that 
machinery ownership is an important condition for cultivation, and hence lack of capital severely 
constrains access to land for the poor.  
                                                 
3 The variable ‘own machinery’ measures the ownership of machinery if the household head is younger than 35. For 
this category of households, machinery ownership can be considered exogenous, as the period of potential 
accumulation is relatively short. 
4 The variable is an index measuring the presence and prevalence of different types of conflicts related to land. 
5 The pro-poor bias might be explained by the fact that the majority of the households in these communities are 
poor.   5
Finally, distance to the market increases the likelihood of renting in, indicating that lower 
profitability (higher transaction costs) makes more land available for rental by landlords with 
higher opportunity cost than tenants. Interestingly, less renting occurs in communities where 
fixed rent contracts are the most common contract used. As the estimations of the determinants 
of renting only allows to capture the matching between landlords and tenants in an indirect way, 
we now turn to analyzing the matching between landlords and tenants directly. 
 
4. Matching in the tenancy markets 
Given the excess demand for land in the regions studied, it seems reasonable to assume 
that the matching equilibrium will be achieved by having the landlord making the offers to the 
tenants, while the tenants have the possibility to accept or reject. Furthermore, we assume that all 
players know the best possible pay-offs of each of the other players. Hence, we will model the 
matching process as a decision process of the landlord, who takes the reservation utility of the 
potential tenants into account. The reservation utility of a potential tenant is the maximum of the 
utility he would derive from his best possible match in the tenancy market and the utility he 
would derive when not participating in the tenancy market.   
We assume that landlords and tenants have perfect information about all the players in 
the market and their preferences. Hence we do not rely on a search mechanism to explain the 
matching patterns as is often done in the literature. (Mortensen, 1982; Pissarides, 1990; Burdett 
and Coles, 1999).  Search will occur if the employers do not have perfect information on the 
traits of the potential employees, but can obtain this information by engaging in a costly search 
process.  The assumption of perfect information on the variables that matter seems warranted for 
the village communities in the DR, as information sharing (gossiping) is an inherent part of 
social life. Furthermore, different studies in other parts of the world find that information on 
attributes of farmers is widely available in village communities (Bardhan, 1984; Bell, 1988; and 
Lanjouw, 1999). In future research, we will formally test this assumption for the regions studied.  
In the context of the rural Dominican Republic, different concerns are likely to influence 
the matching process. In particular, the threat of losing the land because of squatting by the 
tenant, once the plot is rented, is not only likely to decrease the total amount of land offered for 
renting, but might also influence the access to land for specific groups in society. In deciding 
who to rent out to, landlords will account for the probability of losing their land.  We 
hypothesize that conflicts and insecurity of property rights will lead to positive assortative 
matching along group or class-membership.
6 Such positive matching is likely to occur because 
enforcement against squatting is easier for members of the same group. 
In order to test our hypothesis, we will control for other factors that might influence 
matching in the tenancy market. First of all, positive assortative matching along group 
membership can also occur for other reasons. For instance, transaction costs might be lower 
when contracting with people from the same group. Also if effort is better observed or enforced 
within the own class, we would expect such a positive assortative matching (at least for the 
sharecropping contracts).  Other reasons for positive assortative matching could come from 
differences in plot size or crop choice. E.g. if land poor potential tenants are credit constraint and 
hence won’t be able to apply the optimal amount of inputs (such as fertilizer, pesticides and 
machinery) on a large plot of land, they will prefer renting in smaller plots, and landlords in turn 
will prefer not to rent out large plots to them, as they will have a lower profitability. Given that 
                                                 
6 Membership of different groups might be relevant, going from living in the same community, to belonging to a 
same living standard class or landownership class, to, in the limit, belonging to the same family.    6
large landowners are more likely to rent out plots that are larger, positive assortative matching 
will result. Also, if certain crops are more risky but also more profitable, wealthier landlords 
might prefer wealthier (less risk-averse) tenants.  
Furthermore, in the tenancy market, the productive assets (land, labor, capital, education) 
of landlord and tenant are substitutable inputs in the agricultural production function. Therefore, 
Becker’s theorem of assortative mating (1973) predicts that utility maximization by landlords 
and tenants will result in landlords matching with tenants whose endowment of production 
factors is different from their own, which will lead to negative assortative matching along 
productive assets. 
 
4.1 Empirical specification 
The importance of endogenous partner choice for explaining economic outcomes has 
been incorporated in recent studies in different areas of economic activity, such as fertility 
(Rosenzweig, 1999), children’s education (Foster, 1998; Liu and Zhang, 1999), intergenerational 
transmission of religious traits (Bisin, Topa and Verdier, 2000) and choice of the rental contract 
(Ackerberg and Boticelli, 2000). These studies all focus on assortative matching along a certain 
trait and hence, do not fully model all variables influencing the 2-sided utility maximization 
matching process. 
Little empirical work on matching has been done to explain the determinants of matching 
at the individual level. However, two recent papers, Jepsen and Jepsen (1999) and Suen and Lui 
(1999) try to bridge the gap between Becker’s theory of assortative matching in the marriage 
market and the empirics.   
Jepsen and Jepsen (1999) estimate a conditional logit model, modeling the matching 
process as a choice by one of the partners, determined by a vector of characteristics of the 
couple. They use the absolute value of the differences in traits to compare the relationship of the 
traits of the choices to the traits of the chooser. While this is an interesting approach there are 
potential problems with modeling the matching process as a one direction decision process, not 
taking into account utility maximization of the other side, nor the competition in the market. In 
large markets the effect of such competition (i.e. the probability that your preferred match is all 
ready matched with somebody else that he/she prefers) is likely to be negligible. Yet, in thinner 
markets this might not be the case. Furthermore, partner selection differs from a discrete choice 
problem because the choice of a spouse is mutual and because different individuals can not chose 
the same alternative.  
Suen and Li (1999) explore a method that does not build on such an assumption, but is in 
stead directly derived from the Becker model of efficient competitive matching in the marriage 
market. Specifically, Becker’s result that the marriage market maximizes marital output provides 
a framework for estimating a model of spouse selection. This model has the advantage to takethe 
reservation utility of the potential partners into account. However, it draws on the assumption of 
efficiency in the market, which might be too strong an assumption to make in a tenancy market 
characterized by conflicts and insecurity of property rights.  
We model the tenant choice made by the landlord for each plot, based on utility 
maximization, in a conditional logit framework. The conditional logit allows estimating how the 
characteristics of the alternative (i.e. the tenant), as relevant for the landlord, affect the choice of 
the landlord. Specifically, it allows capturing the effect of differences between the characteristics 
of the landlord and the tenant, and hence estimating along which characteristics there is 
assortative matching. Hence, we define the probability that a landlord chooses tenant j for his 
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where E(Uij) is the expected utility the landlord derives from renting out plot i to tenant j,  Xij is 
the vector of characteristics of the partnership created by matching the landlord of plot i with 
tenant j, and β is the vector of coefficients to estimate and I the set of all potential partners for i. 
Note that by modeling the probability of a certain match as a function of all possible matches, we 
account for the distribution of the relevant traits in the population. All possible matches are 
obtained by matching the landlord-plot i with all potential tenants in the community (i.e. all 
households who are reported as wanting to rent in more land at the most common contract).
7 The 
expectation of the utility of the landlord depends on the probability of losing the land through 
squatting. 
We specify Xij as containing variables measuring the absolute value of the difference 
between the landlord’s and the tenant’s characteristics, for those characteristics where we expect 
assortative matching to occur. To measure assortative matching along group membership, we 
enter the absolute value of the difference in living standard group (LCLASSij) and land 
ownership (LANDij).
8 Furthermore, as positive assortative matching is expected to matter more 
for plots with insecure title and/or in communities with more conflicts, interaction terms with 
TITLEi and CONFLICTSi are added.
9  
To control for negative assortative matching along productive assets Xij contains 
variables capturing the difference in productive assets. Specifically it will contain the absolute 
value of the difference in land ownership, labor endowment, LABORij , machinery ownership, 
MACHINij, and human capital endowment, EDUCij (level of education of the household head).  
Since we expect negative matching along productive assets, we expect the coefficient of these 
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The problem with the model specified above, is obviously that it models the matching 
process as a one-sided decision problem without accounting for competition in the market and 
                                                 
7 Given that the communities are located at small distances from each other, one could also consider all potential 
tenants in the region (or in neighboring communities). This approach was not followed because the number of 
across-community matches is rather small and as this would increase the number of non-realized matches 
considerably.  
8 Unfortunately, we do not have information on kinship relationships with households other than the actual tenants, 
and hence we cannot account for positive assortative matching along kinship.  
9 In our sample, given that ownership of a title is largely determined by different historical events that were beyond 
the control of the current possessors, title can be treated as an exogenous variable. Conflicts are a community level 
variable and therefore also exogenous to the household.    8
utility maximization of the tenant. In a market with excess demand however, as we have in the 
two regions studied, this might be a justifiable approximation of the true process.  
In an alternative specification, we introduce tenant fixed effects, to capture the 
reservation utility of each tenant. This is similar to the fixed effects introduced in Suen and Lui 
(1999). The reservation utility of each tenant is the maximum between the utility he would derive 
from his best-possible match and the utility he would derive outside the tenancy market. It hence 
captures the utility maximization process of the tenant and the effect of competition in the 
market. The specification of the conditional logit with tenant fixed effects is consistent with a 
model in which the landlords make the offers and the tenants accept or reject.  
Introduction of the tenant fixed effects solves the two shortcomings of the conditional 
logit specification in Jepsen and Jepsen, i.e. it allows both for accounting for the utility 
maximization of the tenant side, and for competition in the market. In addition, it reduces a 
possible endogeneity bias that might result if there is a unobservable that is correlated both with 
the probability of the match, and with one of the tenant characteristics. At the same time, we do 
not need to make the assumption that the matching market is efficient (as Suen and Lui need to 
do), which might be too strong an assumption to make in a tenancy market characterized by 
conflicts and insecurity of property rights.  
 
4.2.  Estimation results 
The first column in table 3 reports the results for the conditional logit estimation without 
fixed effects for the region of San Francisco de Macoris, i.e. the region with high insecurity of 
property rights. The results provide evidence of positive assortative matching along group 
membership with insecurity of property rights, as households who belong to a different 
ownership class are less likely to match, but only if the landlord has no secure title on the plot. 
Furthermore, in communities with more conflicts, positive assortative matching along living 
standard class is more likely.  The results are also consistent with negative assortative matching 
along productive assets, as the effects of the differences in machinery ownership and differences 
in labor endowments are positive and highly significant. Also, the point estimate for differences 
in education is positive, although not significant.
10  
The second and third column reports results for a restricted sample, in which only the 
actual tenants are considered (as opposed to all the potential tenants). In the third column, the 
specification with tenant fixed effects is reported. We note that the results regarding the positive 
assortative matching along land ownership and living standard group remain in this restricted 
sample, with and without the inclusion of fixed effects. However, the coefficients of the 
differences in productive assets turn insignificant. This indicates that the significant effects in the 
first column, are probably not due to matching along productive assets, but rather capture the 
tenant characteristics. This is consistent with our earlier findings of the importance of asset 
endowment for access to land. However, the robust significant effects of the positive assortative 
matching along land ownership in the presence of insecurity of property rights, confirms the 
main hypothesis of this paper. 
In table 4 the results for the region of Constanza are reported. It is striking, and in line 
with our hypothesis, that in this region, where property rights are much better respected and land 
conflicts are much less prevalent, we do not find positive assortative matching along 
landownership category. The results in the first column do seem to support the negative 
                                                 
10 As there might be a potential endogeneity problem with labor and machinery variables, the estimation was also 
done without these 2 variables (not reported), and the results of the other variables are robust.    9
assortative matching along productive assets, but as was the case for the other region, these 
results disappear once only the restricted sample is used. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  This paper has been motivated by the observation that land rental markets in Latin 
America are atrophied compared to many other parts of the world, particularly Europe, the 
United States, and Asia.  In these other regions, land rental markets have fulfilled important 
efficiency and equity functions. Observed atrophy in Latin America suggests that there exists an 
important missed opportunity to improve the performance of agriculture and to combat rural 
poverty through rentals.  As opposed to other parts of the world where access to land has been 
promoted through the regulation of land rental contracts, the issue of access to land in Latin 
America has focused on a long history of state-led expropriative land reforms and, more recently, 
on land market-assisted land reforms (Deininger, 1997), focusing in all cases on access to land in 
ownership and suppressing access to land through rental arrangements.  Observation of relatively 
inactive land rental markets suggests that the policy focus on access to land needs to go beyond 
land reform and land ownership toward enhancing contractual forms of access to land that are 
less politically demanding than expropriative land reform, cheaper than land market-assisted land 
reform, and more progressive than the free operation of land sales markets.   
To understand the determinants of access to land through the land rental market in a Latin 
American context, this paper uses new survey data for the Dominican Republic.  Results from 
these surveys show that land rental markets can be progressive since those in the community 
with less land are more likely to rent in.  Land rental markets can thus play an equalizing 
function between the distribution of land in ownership and the distribution of land in use.     
However, those who rent are not the poorest since they need working capital (especially 
machinery), some education, and social capital in the community.  Land rental markets thus 
concentrate land among a middle class of endowed tenants.  
Furthermore, the likelihood of renting in is increased by the security of property rights in 
the community and a lower incidence of conflicts over access to land.  Moreover, insecurity of 
property rights constrains the equalizing potential of the land rental market as it induces positive 
assortative matching along land ownership group. Hence, in the absence of secure property 
rights, a segmented rental market results, clearly limiting access to land for the landless and the 
land-poor.  
  Preliminary conclusions to enhance the scope of land rental markets and make these 
markets more effective for efficiency gains and poverty reduction stress three elements.  The first 
is the importance of strengthening property rights through both formal and informal mechanisms.  
In many cases, weakness of property rights affecting rental is due to lingering land reform 
legislation, that has in general fallen into disuse from its initial purpose of land redistribution in 
ownership, but that remains a threat in letting land to be used by tenants.  Urgent is to revise this 
legislation which is creating a loss-loss situation:  it no longer helps the poor access land in 
ownership, and it blocks them from accessing land in rental.  In other cases, weakness of 
property rights is due to incomplete land titling programs, or to titling that has no legitimacy in 
the community because is was not done with local participation and approval (see for example 
Jansen and Roquas (1998) for Honduras).  Secure property rights can also be grounded in the 
social capital of communities (see Katz (1999) for Guatemala), and this too can be modestly 
enhanced through outside interventions (Durston, 1999). 
  The second is the importance of enhancing reliable and low cost conflict resolution 
mechanisms.  Our results show that the existence of conflicts over land in a community is a   10
major deterrent to rentals. Contracting cannot occur without anticipating the emergence of 
conflicts and the mechanisms through which they may be resolved.  Without those, contracting 
will simply not occur.  
  Finally, if the land rental market is to serve as an effective instrument for poverty 
reduction, the performance of this market needs to be “assisted” on behalf of poor participants, in 
the same perspective as land market-assisted land reform for access to land in ownership.  This 
would include helping poor candidates secure the threshold asset endowments needed to enter 
this market.  It would also include the development of innovative institutional arrangements such 
as group rentals, rental with option to buy, and community supervision of rental transactions to 
both secure the rights of the landlord and enhance the bargaining position of the tenant.   
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the two survey regions 
      12
    Constanza
(La Vega)
San Francisco de Macoris
(Duarte) 
           
           
HOUSEHOLDS          
Total number of households    1092    1431 
           
% landlord households    25    10 
% tenant households      22    11 
% autarkic households    11    22 
% landless households    43    58 
            
% land constrained households    46    60 
           
LAND            
Total number of plots    667    658 
        
% plots owner-operated     36    64 
% plots rented out    64    36 
  of which  % plots rented out to family    32    53 
                  % plots rented out to non-family    68    47 
     % plots with written rental contract    1    21 
        
% plots in land reform    5    45 
% plots with title    72    23 
        
% land owner-operated     48    61 
% land rented out      52    39 
   of which % land rented out to family    33    47 
                  % land rented out to non-family    67    53 
     % plots with written rental contract    1    25 
           
% land in land reform      3    41 
% land with title      77    26 
           
COMMUNITIES          
Total number of communities  12    14 
      
% communities with "fear" as main reason for non rental  0    64 
           
% communities with few invasions/occupations    17    36 
% communities with a lot of invasions/occupations    0    21 
           
% communities with few ownership disputes    6    57 
% communities with a lot of ownership disputes    0    7 
           
% communities with few other conflicts    33    14 
% communities with a lot of other conflicts    0    21 
             13
Table 2. Determinants of renting in land: weighted logit estimation  
       
       
        Probability of renting in    Probability of renting in   
Variable name      Variable type° Coeff. Robust z     Coeff. Robust z
       
       
Household asset endowment      
Amount of land owned per capita (ha)  h  -0.0077 -1.97 **    -0.1485 -2.18 ** 
No land owned  h
d  0.7639 4.48 ***   0.8039 4.73 *** 
Education of the household head  h  1.1940 3.07 ***    1.2403 3.21 *** 
Square education of the household head  h  -0.1795 -2.00 **    -0.1941 -2.17 ** 
Household members living in other countries  h  -0.1175 -0.69     -0.1185 -0.67
Own machinery if younger than 35  h
d  1.2433 4.13 ***   1.2114 3.95 *** 
Member of a community organization  h
d  0.3621 2.73 ***   0.3390 2.56 *** 
       
Secure property rights      
Number of parcels with title (actual or provisional)  v  0.0197 3.76 ***   0.0129 3.44 *** 
       
Land conflicts         
Conflicts in the last 5 years    v -0.1977 -2.81 ***    -0.1964 -2.84 *** 
Well united community    v
d -0.3305 -1.98 **    -0.3729 -2.20 ** 
Interaction united community*land owned  h  0.0034 2.40 **    0.0574 2.46 ** 
       
Circle of confidence      
Many family members in the community  h
d 0.6417 2.84 ***    0.5672 2.56 *** 
   Many family members*secure prop rights  h
d -0.0054 -3.19 ***    -0.0049 -3.00 *** 
Number of parcels owned by hh of same living standard  h  -     0.0180 2.17 ** 
   Parcels of hh same living standard*secure prop rights  h  -     0.0000 -0.69
Number of parcels owned by hh from same ownership category  h  0.0056 0.51     -
   Parcels of hh same ownership category*secure prop rights  h  -0.0002 -2.67 ***    -
Living less than 10 years in the community  h
d -0.3677 -0.78     -0.3299 -0.74
   Living less than 10 years*secure prop rights  h
d 0.0023 0.80     0.0018 0.65
       
Supply and demand control variables     
Age of the household head    v  -0.0016 -0.30     -0.0015 -0.29
Female headed household    h  -1.6431 -7.25 ***    -1.6141 -7.13 *** 
Total number of parcels owned by community members  h  -0.0330 -3.19 ***    -0.0391 -5.39 *** 
Total of non-agricultural employment  h  -0.0000 -0.44     0.0000 -0.84
Price of good land (peso/ha)    v  -0.0000 -0.02     0.0002 0.75
Distance to market (minutes)   v  0.0183 2.13 **    0.0229 2.83 *** 
Fixed rent as most common contract  v  -0.1549 -0.78     -0.3443 -1.93 ** 
Number of land owners without machinery  v  0.0666 5.09 ***    0.0521 4.20 *** 
       
San Francisco de Macoris    v
d -1.1975 -3.83 ***    -1.0761 -3.57 *** 
Intercept     v  -3.6251 -5.25 ***    -3.2083 -4.86 *** 
       
Number of observations  1664     1664
Wald chi
2     286.13     282.94
Prob > chi
2     0.0000     0.0000
Pseudo R
2       0.1867     0.1867
% of correct predictions    77     76
Prediction success table    Actual     Actual
   01     01
   Predicted 0 1158 45 Predicted  0 1148 347
   1 345 116     1 55 114
°Variable type: h: household level variable; v: village level variable; d: dummy     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%       14
Table 3: Determinants of matching in the tenancy market in SFM     
All potential tenants  Only actual tenants  Only actual tenants 
    Without tenant fixed effects  Without tenant fixed effects  With tenant fixed effects 
Variable name  Variable  Cond. prob. match beween  Cond. prob. match beween  Cond. prob. match beween 
type °  landlord-plot i and tenant j  landlord-plot i and tenant j  landlord-plot i and tenant j 
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
Absolute difference of productive assets 
   number of adults  |Xj – Xi|  0.2946 2.71*** -0.1674 -1.07  0.0079 0.00 
   machinery ownership  |Xj – Xi|
d  0.8444 3.77***  -   -  
   education household head  |Xj – Xi|  0.2575 1.63 0.0209 0.11 0.2312 0.73 
         
Absolute difference group membership           
   living standard group
a   |Xj – Xi|
d  0.7599 0.97 -0.8408 -3.00***  -0.9535 -2.63*** 
   living standard group*conflicts  |Xj – Xi|
d * Ci  -0.4022 -1.83* -   -   
   living standard group*title  |Xj – Xi|
d * Pi
d
-0.4920 -0.81 -  -   
        
   land owned (1/16 ha)  |Xj - Xi|  -0.0520 -2.15** -0.0374 -1.59  -0.0342 -0.92 
   land owned*conflicts  |Xj - Xi| * Ci  -0.0025 -0.67 -  -   
   land owned*title  |Xj - Xi| * Pi
d  0.0632 2.72*** 0.0752 2.50**  0.0999 2.19** 
Number of observations  4918 767 767
LR chi
2  35.22 15.74 27.39
Prob > chi
2  0.0001 0.0076 1
Pseudo R
2  0.0522 0.0438 0.0763
 
°Variable type: Xj: tenant characteristic; Xi: landlord characteristic; Ci: Community characteristic; Pi: Plot characteristic; d: dummy 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   15
 
Table 4a. Determinants of matching in the tenancy market in Constanza (with all potential tenants) 
All potential tenants  Only actual tenants  Only actual tenants 
Without tenant fixed effects  Without tenant fixed effects  Without tenant fixed effects 
Variable name  Variable  Cond. prob. match beween  Cond. prob. match beween  Cond. prob. match beween 
type ￿  landlord-plot i and tenant j  landlord-plot i and tenant j  landlord-plot i and tenant j 
Coeff. z Coeff. z Coeff. z
           
Absolute difference of productive assets 
   number of adults  |Xj – Xi|  -0.0916 -1.47 -0.0200 -0.28  0.0437 0.14
   machinery ownership  |Xj – Xi|
d  0.5033 4.06*** 0.1829 1.46  0.0626 0.41
   education household head  |Xj – Xi|  0.2182 1.72* 0.1335 1 -0.1921 -1
         
Absolute difference group membership           
   living standard group
a   |Xj – Xi|
d  0.2852 0.59 -0.0937 -0.48 -0.0264 -0.11
   living standard group*conflicts  |Xj – Xi|
d * Ci  -0.1798 -1.3 -   -  
   living standard group*title  |Xj – Xi|
d * Pi
d
-0.2481 -0.48 -  -
     
   land owned (1/16 ha)  |Xj - Xi|  0.0002 0.04 0.0023 0.49 0.0016 0.32
   land owned*conflicts  |Xj - Xi| * Ci  0.0003 0.23 -  -   
   land owned*title  |Xj - Xi| * Pi
d  -0.0028 -0.64 -0.0032 -0.66 -0.0026 -0.49
                  
             
Number of observations  18244 5857 5857
LR chi
2  33.55 4.34 57.45
Prob > chi
2  0.0001 0.6307 1
Pseudo R
2  0.019 0.0035 0.0462
                                
°Variable type: Xj: tenant characteristic; Xi: landlord characteristic; Ci: Community characteristic; Pi: Plot characteristic; d: dummy 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 